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Xen Security Advisory CVE-2019-19579 / XSA-306
Device quarantine for alternate pci assignment methods
UPDATES IN VERSION 3
XSA-302 relies on the use of libxl's "assignable-add" feature to
prepare devices to be assigned to untrusted guests.
Unfortunately, this is not considered a strictly required step for
device assignment. The PCI passthrough documentation on the wiki
describes alternate ways of preparing devices for assignment, and
libvirt uses its own ways as well. Hosts where these "alternate"
methods are used will still leave the system in a vulnerable state
after the device comes back from a guest.
An untrusted domain with access to a physical device can DMA into host
memory, leading to privilege escalation.
Only systems where guests are given direct access to physical devices
capable of DMA (PCI pass-through) are vulnerable. Systems which do
not use PCI pass-through are not vulnerable.
Only systems which use "alternate" methods to assign devices to pciback
before assignment are vulnerable. These methods include:
- Assigning devices on the Linux command-line using `xen-pciback.hide`
- Assigning devices via xen-pciback module parameters
- Assigning devices manually via sysfs
- Assigning devices using libvirt
Systems which use `xl pci-assignable-add` or
libxl_device_pci_assignable_add, or have the assignable state handled
automatically via setting the `seize` parameter, are not affected.
For xl and libvirt, before assigning a device to a guest, manually run
`xl pci-assignable-add`. This will quarantine the device even if the
device has already been assigned to pciback by one of the alternate
methods. This may also work for other libxl-based toolstacks,
depending on the particular implementation.
This issue was discovered by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki of Invisible
Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue.
Note that this patch will quarantine the device after the domain is
destroyed by default. It must be un-quarantined before it can be used
by domain 0 again. This can be done by executing `xl
pci-assignable-remove`. This will be effective even if the device was
assigned to pciback with one of the alternate methods.
xsa306-4.12.patch Xen 4.12.x
xsa306-4.11.patch Xen 4.11.x, Xen 4.10.x
xsa306-4.9.patch Xen 4.9.x, Xen 4.8.x
$ sha256sum xsa306*
DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).
Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)
For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
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