[xen stable-4.6] x86/cpuid: Improvements to guest policies for speculative sidechannel features

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[xen stable-4.6] x86/cpuid: Improvements to guest policies for speculative sidechannel features

patchbot
commit 0d3904fd43610b5fd931c068667f4b5d9be6c9bb
Author:     Andrew Cooper <[hidden email]>
AuthorDate: Tue May 29 11:06:56 2018 +0200
Commit:     Jan Beulich <[hidden email]>
CommitDate: Tue May 29 11:06:56 2018 +0200

    x86/cpuid: Improvements to guest policies for speculative sidechannel features
   
    If Xen isn't virtualising MSR_SPEC_CTRL for guests, IBRSB shouldn't be
    advertised.  It is not currently possible to express this via the existing
    command line options, but such an ability will be introduced.
   
    Another useful option in some usecases is to offer IBPB without IBRS.  When a
    guest kernel is known to be compatible (uses retpoline and knows about the AMD
    IBPB feature bit), an administrator with pre-Skylake hardware may wish to hide
    IBRS.  This allows the VM to have full protection, without Xen or the VM
    needing to touch MSR_SPEC_CTRL, which can reduce the overhead of Spectre
    mitigations.
   
    Break the logic common to both PV and HVM CPUID calculations into a common
    helper, to avoid duplication.
   
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <[hidden email]>
    Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <[hidden email]>
    Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <[hidden email]>
    master commit: cb06b308ec71b23f37a44f5e2351fe2cae0306e9
    master date: 2018-05-16 12:19:10 +0100
---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 3 +++
 xen/arch/x86/traps.c   | 8 +++++++-
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 78f44c5f66..67f75b9ff0 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4624,6 +4624,9 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
 
         if ( count == 0 )
         {
+            if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) )
+                *edx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB);
+
             /*
              * Override STIBP to match IBRS.  Guests can safely use STIBP
              * functionality on non-HT hardware, but can't necesserily protect
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index c23f4c0edb..1e71c05b28 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -879,6 +879,9 @@ void pv_cpuid(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
         case 0x00000007:
             if ( regs->_ecx == 0 )
             {
+                if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) )
+                    d &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB);
+
                 /*
                  * Override STIBP to match IBRS.  Guests can safely use STIBP
                  * functionality on non-HT hardware, but can't necesserily protect
@@ -966,7 +969,10 @@ void pv_cpuid(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
                   cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_ADX)  |
                   cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE));
 
-            d &= cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB);
+            if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) )
+                d &= cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB);
+            else
+                d = 0;
 
             /* Override STIBP to match IBRS (see above). */
             if ( d & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) )
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.6

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